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Abstract
We model entrepreneurship and the emergence of rms as an out-
come of simultaneous bidding for labor services among heterogeneous
agents. What distinguishes our approach from prior work is that oc-
cupational choice and job matching are determined simultaneously, so
that the opportunity costs of entrepreneurs are accounted for. Those
who are relatively unmanageable, while possibly excellent managers
themselves, become entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs compete and create
value by building e¢ cient organizations and o¤ering potentially well-
paid jobs to others. While the entry of an additional entrepreneur
typically reduces some individual wages, we show that it always raises
the average wage and depresses the average income of incumbent en-
trepreneurs. This result may help explain the empirically low returns
to entrepreneurship.
JEL: L26, J24, J31, D20, L23
How talent is allocated to rms through the labor market a¤ects produc-
tivity. One aspect of this process is the basic "occupational choice" made
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by every individual - whether to run a rm or seek employment elsewhere.
An income-maximizer will become an entrepreneur if the anticipated prot is
higher than the going wage. The occupational choice literature (Lucas [29],
Kihlstrom and La¤ont [20], Evans and Jovanovic [13], Laussel and Le Breton
[25]) generally treats the entrepreneurial payo¤ as a random variable that
depends on personal characteristics, and the wage as an exogenously xed
alternative.
There are three problems with this approach, which this paper is meant to
address. (1) Empirically, it is a well-established fact that entrepreneurs tend
to earn less, not more, than comparable employees. For example, Hamilton
[16] found for the US that staying in a salaried job, or returning to it, pays
better than self-employment in the short and in the long run (except for
entrepreneurs in the highest income quartile). (2) What jobs are availabe
and what they pay depends on which rms come into existence; hence, the
opportunity cost of becoming an entrepreneur is not independent of who
becomes an entrepreneur. (3) If prospective entrepreneurs have valuable
skills, why are they not rewarded by potential employers?
To resolve these issues, a theoretical model of entrepreneurship needs to
endogenize wages and allow them to be sensitive to individual characteristics.
The literature on job matching (Crawford and Knoer [7], Kelso and Crawford
[19], Roth [35], Hateld and Milgrom [18]) partially meets these criteria. It
constructs personalized wages through a sequential bidding process, where
the productive contribution of a worker in a rm is unique and potentially
depends on co-workers. However, what makes these models unattractive
for studying entrepreneurship is that the rms and their technologies are
taken as given, and assumptions (e.g. workers are substitutes) are imposed
somewhat arbitrarily. One does not learn from these models who becomes an
entrepreneur and how this a¤ects the types of technologies that will actually
be observed.
In this paper, we model occupational choice and job matching simulta-
neously: one becomes an entrepreneur if that is preferable to the best job
o¤ered by others who are becoming entrepreneurs. It is in any entrepre-
neurs interest to take advantage of the managerial skills of employees by
creating a hierarchical organization structure. This is an important aspect
of the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship: more talented individuals have
better prospects as entrepreneurs, but also as employees.1 Hence we make
1Delegation leads to a departure from the logic in Lazear [26], [27], where more exible
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the process by which entrepreneurs build organizations explicit.2
In equilibrium, the entrepreneurs are those who can create more value
under self-management than under the management of someone else. This
may reect being relatively "unmanageable" more than being a business
visionary or manager extraordinaire, although those types of entrepreneurs
exist in our model as well. Whatever value entrepreneurs create, they do
not have the option to earn a better income working for someone else. As
in reality, this logic is consistent with low incomes for many entrepreneurs,
who cannot attract good wage o¤ers, given their characteristics.
The organizations that are going to be operated in equilibrium are uniquely
determined by the individual characteristics of the entrepreneurs and their
workforces. Both complement and substitute relationships between workers
are possible. This can cause some of the expected supply-and-demand rela-
tionships in the labor market to fail. With xed labor supply, an increase
in the demand for labor would normally increase all wages. With comple-
mentarities between workers, this is no longer true: entry of an additional
entrepreneur typically reduces some individual wages. However, we show
that it still increases wages on average because the losses of some employees
will always be compensated by the gains of others. This is not an obvious
property unless one imposes a priori that workers are substitutes.
Occupational choices therefore determine how wages compare to entre-
preneurial prots. The typical wage may well exceed the typical prot if
many entrepreneurs are of the "relatively unmanageable" variety, i.e. they
are motivated by poor employment options, rather than high expected prof-
its. Their rms can nevertheless create good jobs for individuals who are
valuable employees because they are easily managed. We illustrate this pos-
sibility with an example later in the paper and thereby o¤er one explanation
for Hamiltons [16] empirical results.
Literature that has allowed for complementarities in a two-sided matching
or coalition-formation context has almost exclusively focused on the existence
individuals necessarily become entrepreneurs. In a model with organizations , one can
benet from managerial skills as an employee.
2There has long been a literature on hierarchical rms, begun by Rosen [34], but it does
not account for labor market competition between entrepreneurs. Organization forms also
arise endogenously in Legros and Newman [28] as a response to moral hazard: their rms
have a choice between investing in monitoring technology (M -rms) and writing incentive-
compatible contracts (I-rms). We do not treat agency problems explicitly, and we refer
to organization in another sense, as an assignment of employees to managers.
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of stable outcomes (Sasaki and Toda [36], Dutta and Masso [9], Banerjee et
al. [2], Ma [30], Echenique and Oviedo [10], Klaus and Klijn [21], Hateld and
Kojima [17], Kojima et al. [22]). The main exception we are aware of is Pycia
[32], who independently from us developed an example of the comparative
statics under complementarity (where removing an agent from one side of a
two-sided market makes an agent on the other side worse o¤, which cannot
occur under substitutability). There are important di¤erences between our
model and Pycias: his rms are exogenously given, and workers match to
rms before they can bargain over the division of value among members. In
our model, individuals join rms (or start rms themselves) conditional on
wage o¤ers, which is more similar to an actual labor market. Our result that
wages rise with entrepreneurial entry on average is also new.
Another related literature considers the formation of clubs (Ellickson et al.
[11], [12]) and partnerships (Farrell and Scotchmer [14]). Although clubs are
usually interpreted as groups that jointly consume a good, they are formally
similar to partnerships, which engage in joint production. These papers
contrast with ours in that they refer to coalitions of equal individuals with no
internal structure and no notion of entrepreneurship. Zame [39] introduces
specic tasks into his general-equilibrium framework with rm formation.
A rm type is dened by the roles its workers need to ll, a production
technology, and a contract that allocates net output among the workers. A
rm comes into existence when, in equilibrium, every role attracts an agent
with appropriate skills. Hence, the agents coordinate on the equilibrium rm
structure through their job choices, as in our model. But in Zame, there is
no explicit mechanism through which coordination occurs - there is no active
rm-building by entrepreneurs.3 On the other hand, Zame addresses moral
hazard and adverse selection issues that we sidestep.
The next section describes the model and assumptions about primitives,
as well as the nature of equilibrium. Then we discuss the unique member-
ship and organization of equilibrium rms. They can be obtained from the
primitives by a simple algorithm. Subsequently, we study the equilibrium
3One can, however, link these models conceptually. If we view our rms from Zames
perspective, then entrepreneuris one of the roles each rm has to ll. The contract gives
the entrepreneur a claim to all output, which can be valued at the equilibrium goods prices
and treated as prot. In return, the entrepreneur transfers a sum to the other workers
that is divided into wage payments for each role. Our rm types can be described as sets
of skills / actions that an entrepreneur may buy in the labor market, similar to the specic
skill requirements of roles in Zames rms.
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payo¤ distribution between entrepreneurs and wage earners. We show that a
greater number of entrepreneurs leads to (weakly) higher wages and (weakly)
lower incomes for the incumbent entrepreneurs. When entrepreneurial entry
is imitative (copies part of an existing organization structure), these e¤ects
are strict. The possibility that entrepreneurial incomes fall short of the aver-
age wage is illustrated by a simple numerical example. Finally, we elaborate
how complement and substitute relationships between workers arise endoge-
nously. Proofs are collected in the appendix.
1 A Labor Market Auction Model of Entre-
preneurship
1.1 Summary
Our model works as follows. For any pair of agents i and j, in a nite
population N , there are conditional productivities (i) vij and (ii) vji that
reect (i) the output that j can create under is management and (ii) the
output that i can create under js management. The value vij is realized
if j is assigned to i ("is managed by i") in the organization structure their
employer (the entrepreneur) implements. The entire matrix of conditional
productivities 264 v11    v1n... . . . ...
vn1    vnn
375
is assumed to be commonly known. The i-th row lists what each individual
in the economy could produce under manager i; the i-th column shows what
i could produce under alternative managers.
A rm F  N is a set of individuals who are connected through manage-
rial assignments: each member has a superior, who must be a member of F
(and who could be oneself). Thus, an assignment function m : N  2N ! N
for a rm F links each member j of F to another member i of F , producing
assignments i = m (j; F ), which are interpreted as "i is the manager of j in
rm F ." Unlike the conditional productivities, the assignment function is not
exogenous: it is chosen by the entrepreneur who employs the rms members
through successful wage o¤ers in the labor market. If h is the entrepreneur
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who creates the rm in this sense, we label it Fh, and the assignment function
that h implements is denoted as mh.
The total output of the rm is the sum of individual outputs, given the
assignments to managers. Hence, rm Fh operates the production function4X
j2Fh
vmh(j;Fh)j:
This value accrues to the entrepreneur, although some of it goes toward pay-
ing wages that were promised to employees. Entrepreneurs attract employees
through wage bids, which they base on the value employees can create in the
rm. Clearly, the entrepreneur will want to make managerial assignments
that maximize the value of the rm. The resulting organization determines
what an employee will add and what the entrepreneur is willing to o¤er.
Our labor market is a simultaneous auction where everyone submits wage
o¤ers to everyone, self included. Hiring oneself is what we mean by "becoming
an entrepreneur." Hence, everyone in our economy is a potential entrepre-
neur. Each individual ranks employers, depending on the wage o¤ers she
receives. We assume purely monetary preferences, which means that one of
the high bids is always accepted (with the caveat that, in evaluating o¤ers
to self, one also needs to include the prot that could be earned after wage
payments as an entrepreneur).
In calculating wage bids, one must take into account who else will join the
rm and be available as a manager. In the perfect information environment
4Our production function can be viewed as the reduced form of a Cobb-Douglas function
with capital and a managed labor force
yh = K

h
0@X
j2Fh
vmh(j;Fh)j
1A1  :
If entrepreneurs obtain capital at interest rate r in a nancial market, optimal borrowing
implies
Kh =

1
r

1=(1 ) X
j2Fh
vmh(j;Fh)j ;
so that
yh   rKh = (1  )

1
r

=(1 ) X
j2Fh
vmh(j;Fh)j
(the multiplier is immaterial to our analysis).
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that we study in this paper, it is possible to correctly anticipate this, but
it involves thinking about three-part strategies. Part (1) is the assignment
function: for any subset S that might accept individual is o¤ers, who should
optimally manage whom in S? This determines the value of any rm i might
run, and the incremental value of any employee i might hire. Part (2) is the
set of wage o¤ers that individual i will make. Part (3) is the employer choice
function: for any set of wage o¤ers individual i might receive, which would
i accept? The equilibrium strategy prole yields occupational choices, rm
memberships, organization structures and incomes endogenously.
1.2 Conditional Productivities and Noncircularity
The conditional productivity vij 2 R+ is the revenue (prot before wages)
that j can generate for the rm Fh if the entrepreneur (h) assigns i as js
manager. Since the conditional productivity is by assumption exogenous,
it is not a¤ected by how many, and which, other individuals i manages, or
by who manages i. It also does not depend on the wage j is paid. This
need not mean that there is no principal-agent problem. The conditional
productivities may reect, in addition to js skill at the job and is skill
at designing tasks, how willingly j exerts e¤ort and how well i monitors. If
e¤ort were unobservable, vij could be interpreted as js expected performance
under the optimal contract.
We rule out equal conditional productivities under di¤erent managers
in the interest of e¢ cient notation: vik 6= vkj for i 6= k. (But employees
may be equally productive under a particular manager, so it is possible that
vij = vik.) The restriction is plausible if the primitive values are drawn from
a continuous distribution (that may have a spike at zero). Since vij  0 by
assumption, this means also that for everyone there is some manager who
elicits strictly positive productivity.
For the intended interpretation of the model, it is desirable that equilib-
rium assignments are hierarchical (there is no circular authority, such that
i is both superior and subordinate to j). This allows to clearly identify the
individual at the top of an organization as the entrepreneur and label rms
accordingly. For organizations to have hierarchical, tree-like structures, con-
ditional productivities need to satisfy an axiom that amounts to transitivity
of managerial ability: if i is a superior manager for j (i.e. vij  vjj), and j is
a superior manager for k (i.e. vjk  vkk), then i should be more productive
under self-management than under k (vii  vki). We extend this logic to
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arbitrary chains.
Axiom: Noncircularity. Suppose that the members of S  N can be
assigned "manager ranks" from 1 to n such that v12  v22, v23  v33, . . . ,
v(n 1)n  vnn. Then vn1  v11, i.e. n does not rank above i.
One way to think about noncircularity at an intuitive level is to imagine
that the population is divided into natural supervisors and natural super-
visees, who are completely specialized in these roles. Then, vij > vjj if i is
a supervisor and j is a supervisee, vjj > vij if roles are reversed, or vij = vjj
if both are of the same type. These conditional productivities satisfy noncir-
cularity. The axiom allows for more complex patterns that retain the avor
that a good manager for one individual tends to be a good manager for an-
other. In particular, it could be restated as follows: suppose vjk  vkk, then
vkj  vjj; moreover, vki  vii for all i such that vij  vjj; moreover vkh  vhh
for all h such that vhi  vii, and so on. But noncircularity does not require
one individual to be the best manager for everyone: vij > vjj is consistent
with vjk > vik.
A strengthening of noncircularity provides a simpler axiom that ts many
of our intended applications. The following might be termed "positive agency
cost:" for all i; j 2 N , vii  vij, i.e. i can manage self more e¤ectively than
others. This statement implies noncircularity, e.g. vij  vjj and vjk  vkk
lead to vii  vij  vjj  vjk  vkk  vki. Positive agency cost is plausible
when management is top-down (i sets tasks for j without seeking js advice),
and delegation may result in a loss from communication barriers and partial
e¤ort. The role of j is then merely to carry out instructions as closely as
possible.
In applications, it may be meaningful to infer conditional productivities
from distances between points associated with the individuals. These points
could be attributes in a social or professional characteristics space, where dis-
tances represent communication barriers or skill mismatch. Positive agency
cost is satised by values that are spatial in the following sense: there exists a
mapping f : N ! Rl and a distance metric d : N N ! R such that, for all
i; j; k 2 N , vij  vik if and only if d (f (i) ; f (j))  d (f (i) ; f (k)). To verify
that positive agency cost (and therefore noncircularity) holds, note simply
that d (f (i) ; f (i)) = 0  d (f (i) ; f (j)) for all j 2 N , so that vii  vij.5
5The converse, that conditional productivities consistent with positive agency cost are
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Since positive agency cost implies noncircularity, the conditional productiv-
ities we admit include anything that could be derived from a spatial model,
where agents are associated with points in Rn and the value one individual
can create under anothers management declines in the interpersonal dis-
tance.
1.3 Non-Cooperative Game
The conditional productivities are our economys data. We dene now strat-
egy spaces and our equilibrium notion, which is a renement of Nashs. The
manager assignment is a function mi : N  2N ! N such that mi (j; C) 2 C.
It identies whom (in C  N) i would assign to manage j 2 C.6 Let Mi
be the set of such functions. Wage o¤ers are a function wi : N ! R+ that
species a bid for everyones labor services (including is own). Let Wi be
the set of such functions.7 Employer choice is a function ei : Rn+ ! N which
names, for every set of o¤ers w1 (i) ; w2 (i) ; : : : ; wn (i) to i, the bidder j 2 N
whose o¤er is accepted (possibly is own o¤er). Let Ei be the set of such
functions.8
Given a strategy prole s 2 i2NSi (where Si = Mi Wi  Ei), a rm
spatial, is not true. For example, let (1) vii > vij > vik, (2) vjj > vjk > vji, (3) vkk >
vki > vkj . While (1) and (3) would imply d (f (i) ; f (j)) < d (f (i) ; f (k)) < d (f (j) ; f (k)),
(2) requires d (f (j) ; f (k)) < d (f (i) ; f (j)). By extension, noncircularity is also strictly
more general than the spatial property.
6Notation is loose here. The domain of the function is implicity restricted to pairs
(i; C) 2 N  2N with i 2 C.
7A subtle restriction is hidden in the form of the wage o¤ers. In general, i would like
to o¤er a schedule of wages to each j 2 N that depends on the o¤ers j is making. Then
i can reward j for competing less aggressively in the labor market. In particular, i would
prevent any employee j from making the best alternative bid for another of is employees
k. To this end, i would o¤er j a higher wage if j bids zero for k. Because we do not
allow such tie-ins (by forcing o¤ers to be in R+), competing bids for is employees may
come from within is rm. Internal competition, from potential spin-o¤s, is important in
practice.
8Employer choice, as we have dened it, precludes a preference for working under
specic managers. In practice, the best-paid job is not always chosen: it may be desirable
to work with the supervisor that makes the agent most productive; one may prefer to
be ones own boss; social and family relations may a¤ect the benets of a job. In our
economy, social considerations are absent, job o¤ers are evaluated only on wages. Holding
multiple jobs is ruled out.
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Fi (s) consists of those individuals who select i as their employer:
Fi (s) = fj 2 N s.t. ej (w) = ig :
(We use letters without subscripts to denote proles, e.g. w  fwigi2N is
the set of all wage o¤ers.) Since everyone accepts exactly one wage o¤er, the
collection of rms in the economy is a partition of N . Some rms may well
be empty: if Fi (s) = ?, we will call i an employee; if Fi (s) 6= ?, i is an
entrepreneur.
The prot that accrues to an entrepreneur i is the di¤erence between
value created (under the organization structure that is implemented by mi)
and wages paid:
i (s) =
X
j2Fi(s)
vmi(j;Fi(s))j  
X
j2Fi(s)
wi (j) : (1)
Note that the income of entrepreneurs, i.e. i 2 Fi (s), is invariant to the
wages they pay themselves: wi (i) + i (s) is constant with respect to wi (i).
Denition: LaborMarket. The labor market is a game   =

N; fvijgi;j2N ;i2NSi; fuigi2N

,
with strategy space Si = Ri Wi  Ei for each i 2 N , conditional produc-
tivities that satisfy noncircularity, and preferences represented by a utility
function ui : R! R+ that increases monotonically in income wei(w) (i)+i (s)
for all i 2 N .
We treat   as a normal-form game: strategies are chosen simultaneously;
in particular, every i 2 N plans the internal structure of any rm i may run,
makes wage o¤ers to all j 2 N , and decides how to select among wage o¤ers
i will receive.
A solution of   is a Nash equilibrium in undominated pure strategies that
leads to well-structured rms in a sense we will explain. Strategy si 2 Si is
undominated if there exists no s0i 2 Si such that ui (s0i; s i)  ui (si; s i) for
all s i 2 j2NnfigSj, and ui (s0i; s i) > ui (si; s i) for some s i 2 j2NnfigSj.
That is, if si is not weakly dominated by, and in some situation strictly worse
than, another strategy.
The rationale for ruling out equilibria in (weakly) dominated strategies is
that agents can otherwise o¤er wages they are not prepared to pay, knowing
they will be outbid. In standard auctions with private-values, all bidders
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believe they have a positive probability of winning, and this prevents over-
bidding. But in a perfect information setting like ours, there is no risk of
winning by accident. To illustrate why we rule out (weakly) dominated
strategies, suppose the best manager for j is h, and h and i will both be
entrepreneurs. Then i will bid less for j than vhj (since h is not available
as a manager in Fi), but possibly more than js maximal productivity in Fi,
because in equilibrium h must beat is bid. Entrepreneurs might have to
pay unreasonably high wages - but such equilibria seem unstable, since they
depend on a blu¤ that is not called.
In principle, several employees of a rm could be assigned to manage
themselves. This type of arrangement is problematic: no nal authority ex-
ists to resolve coordination failures (admittedly, coordination is not required
in the strict connes of our model). One might conjecture that i, as the
designer of rm Fi (s), would not adopt such a structure, unless it is strictly
protable to do so. Hence we focus on equilibria where, in each rm, only
one individual reports to self. Moreover, in Fi (s), it seems reasonable that
this individual should be i.9
Denition: Hierarchical Assignment. The managerial assignment mi is
hierarchical if, for all i; j 2 N , mi (j; Fi (s)) = j only if i = j.
Hierarchical assignments are not an assumption, but a renement prop-
erty of equilibria. We eliminate no strategies and require solutions to be
Nash equilibria on the full domain of the strategy space i2NSi.10 Not join-
ing Fi (s) or choosing a non-hierarchical assignment for Fi (s), which are
9If we only impose that there is a unique individual, not necessarily i, who reports to
self in Fi, we get permutations of rm names. The membership and structure of Fi migrate
to Fk in alternate equilibria. To elaborate, if someone other than i could be at the top of
Fi, then the naming of the rm becomes arbitrary. (We could have j 2 Fi at the top of
Fi or i 2 Fh at the top of Fh and so forth.) This would lead to duplicate equilibria, where
the rm memberships, managerial assignments and payo¤s are the same, except the rms
are named di¤erently (i is at the top of a rm that in one equilibrium is called Fi and in
another equilibrium Fj). Since distinguishing these equilibria is not interesting - they are
exactly the same except for naming - we eliminate the duplicates by making precise how
rms are to be named. Since only one individual in a rm can self-manage, we can do this
by imposing that only the person after whom the rm is named can self-manage. (This is
the same as saying the rm must be named after whoever self-manages.)
10The reason is partly technical: since strict ordering requires i 2 Fi (s) or Fi (s) = ?,
i could not make o¤ers without committing to be an entrepreneur if the restriction were
applied to the strategy space.
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unilateral deviations for i, cannot be payo¤-improving in an equilibrium for
any i 2 N .
Denition: Equilibrium. Strategy prole s 2 i2NSi is an equilibrium of
  if, for every i 2 N , si is undominated, mi is hierarchical, and ui
 
si ; s

 i
 
ui
 
s0i; s

 i

for all s0i 2 Si.
As we show next, the identities of the entrepreneurs, as well as the em-
ployees and organization structures of their rms, are determined uniquely in
equilibrium. Because entrepreneurs have the power to make ultimatum wage
o¤ers in the labor market, their equilbrium incomes are determinate. The
same is not true for individual wages, but since all equilibria divide income
between entrepreneurs and the total workforce in the same way, the average
wage is also unique.
2 Firms
2.1 Equilibrium Membership and Organization
Associated with an equilibrium s is a partition ofN into rms Fi (s). In this
section we derive the unique membership and organization of the equilibrium
rms. The requirement that equilibrium play is undominated imposes a few
specic constraints. First, entrepreneurs always assign the best available
manager to each employee. Second, workers join the rm that makes the
highest wage o¤er to them.11
Lemma (P1). For all i 2 N , si 2 Si is an undominated strategy only if:
(i) for all C  N and all j 2 C, mi (j; C) = h only if vhj  vkj for all k 2 C;
(ii) ei (w) = h 6= i only if wh (i)  wk (i) for all k 2 N n i.12
11That is, individuals accept the highest wage conditional on becoming workers. It must
exceed a reservation level that reects the option to be self-employed and contribute to
value creation in ones own rm. Else, they become entrepreneurs and then may pay
themselves less than their "market wage."
12The function ei selects, for every possible set of wage o¤ers i might receive, an em-
ployer. Hence, (ii) is not conditional on actual wage o¤ers received in equilibrium. It
requires i to commit to accept one of the highest o¤ers (if there are several) whenever i
does not become an entrepreneur. Ties are broken by ei. If i has equal o¤ers, there are
several best responses. In equilibrium, the o¤er of the rm with the highest valuation for
the worker must be chosen, else we do not have an equilibrium strategy prole (since said
12
Given hierarchical assignments, so that only entrepreneurs can manage
themselves, they must join their own rms if they hire any employees in
equilibrium.
Lemma (P2). For all i 2 N , if Fi (s) 6= ?, then i 2 Fi (s).
Now we introduce notation that greatly simplies the characterization
of equilibria. Intuitively, rms will be blocks of complementary individuals
who can create value, i.e. e¤ectively manage each other, independently of
outsiders. Equilibrium rms can be characterized in terms of the set of indi-
viduals for whom i induces the highest productivity (is the ideal manager),
Gi = fj 2 N s.t. vij  vkj for all k 2 Ng ;
and its transitive closure,
Gi =

j 2 N s.t., for some fk1; k2; : : : ; kg  N ,
k1 2 Gi; k2 2 Gk1 ; : : : ; j 2 Gk

:
The latter is the set of individuals whose ideal manager is someone whose
ideal manager is someone ... whose ideal manager is i. The ideal assign-
ment of the entire population could be visualized as a group of trees, each
branching out from an individual who is her own ideal manager (a likely
entrepreneur) to members of "upper management" whose ideal manager is
an entrepreneur, to members of "middle management" whose ideal manager
is in upper management, etc. Gi contains everyone "under i," the subtree
that begins with i.
Lemma (P3). For all i; j; j0 2 N such that i 6= j 6= j0 6= i,
(i) Gi \Gj = ?;
(ii) Gi  Gi;
(iii) if j 2 Gi, then (a) i =2 Gj, (b) i =2 Gj, (c) j =2 Gj, (d) Gj  Gi;
(iv) Gi\ Gj = ? or Gi  Gj or Gj  Gi, and if j; j0 2 Gi, then Gj\ Gj0 = ?;
(v) Gi [
[
j2Gi
Gj = Gi.
If j belongs to the rm Fi (s) (where possibly i = j), then js comple-
mentary block Gj can create more value in Fi (s) than anywhere else, since
rm has a protable deviation - to increase its o¤er - given that is strategy is to reject in
case another rm makes an equal o¤er).
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the ideal managers for members of Gj are themselves in Gj [ j. Hence, js
employer is able to make the highest bid for Gj.
Lemma (P4). For all i; j 2 N , if j 2 Fi (s), then Gj  Fi (s).
Then we can describe membership in equilibrium rms in terms of the
complementary blocks.
Proposition (P5). For all i 2 N , either Fi (s) = ? or Fi (s) = Gi.
Nothing in P5 prevents rms from being empty. In particular, Fi (s) = ?
if i =2 Gi, i.e. (by P3ii) if i =2 Gi. The rms partition N since x 2 Gi and
i 2 Gi imply x 2 Gj only if Gj  Gi (by inductive application of P3iiid).
The structure of the complementary blocks suggests a simple algorithm
to solve for equilibrium rms. We dene a function f 0 : N ! N that maps
to i 2 N the individual under whose management i is most productive.
f 0 (i) = j s.t. vji  vki for all k 2 N:
Iterations f t+1 (i) = f (f t (i)) successively assign to i the ideal manager, the
ideal manager of is ideal manager, etc. The sequence ff tgt2N converges
because N is nite and conditional productivities are noncircular. Its limit,
f1 = f t such that f t = f t+1, ranges over the set of individuals who are their
own ideal managers. These are the entrepreneurs. One can express the rm
run by i as
Fi (s
) = fj 2 N s.t. f1 (j) = ig :
On the basis of P5, we can say more about the equilibrium organization of
rms. Since j 2 Fi (s) only if the largest complementary block that includes
j is in Fi (s), js ideal manager, k such that j 2 Gk, is available. P1 says
that k must then be chosen to manage j by all undominated strategies, hence
in any equilibrium.
Proposition (P6). In any equilibrium, for all i 2 N and j 2 Fi (s),
mi (j; Fi (s
)) = k such that j 2 Gk.
This strengthens P1i (which entails that only assignments to the ideal
manager within the rm are undominated) to the statement that, in equilib-
rium rms, employees are assigned to the ideal manager in the entire popu-
lation. Hence, P6 ensures that equilibria are e¢ cient: everyone is optimally
assigned and creates the greatest possible value.
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2.2 Equilibrium Technology: Complements vs. Sub-
stitutes
In standard job matching models, workers are either substitutes or comple-
ments by assumption. In the salary adjustment process Kelso and Crawford
[19] proposed, the best o¤er to a given worker must be repeated in the fol-
lowing round, while others may raise their bids. The central premise behind
this approach is that rms will not want to withdraw a successful o¤er to one
worker when competition for other workers intensies. Hence the workers
value to the rm must not be diminished if co-workers are lost. Earlier,
Crawford and Knoer [7] assumed that employee productivity is invariant to
who else joins the rm. Kelso and Crawford [19] generalized to the "gross
substitutes" property, which is imposed in a number of subsequent studies.
Workers are gross substitutes if higher salary o¤ers to one do not adversely
a¤ect rmswillingness to hire the other.
Complementarity has been introduced through preferences over matches
to other individuals (colleagues, club members, couples), economies of scale
that depend only on the number of workers the rm employs (Farrell and
Scotchmer [14]) and through supermodularity (Sherstyuk [37]).13 A new
hire makes existing employees more valuable, and the size of the externality
increases with every additional worker. Then no two workers are substitutes.
Imposing such relationships uniformly is appropriate for certain prob-
lems, but is not really suited to employees in rms. Whether a given pair are
complements or substitutes is in our approach an aspect of the equilibrium
organization technology, not a fundamental property. That substitute and
complement workers should coexist in hierarchical organizations is quite in-
tuitive: the di¤erent roles in a rm are complementary, real substitutability
only exists within a role. For example for a building company, di¤erent ar-
chitects may be substitutes, whereas an architect and a construction worker
are complements. Two workers are complements in our model if they inter-
act at di¤erent levels of the hierarchy: one is assigned to manage the other.
On the other hand, they are substitutes if they compete on the same level
of the hierarchy: one can replace the other as manager of a given group of
13A related kind of complementarity appears in Kremers [24] model of interdependent
production tasks. Here, the likelihood of completing a job successfully increases in the
skill of co-workers at their roles. A skilled individual bestows a symmetric externality on
all colleagues. One implication that is not echoed in our model is that similarly skilled
individuals tend to be hired into the same rms.
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employees.
Suppose rm h increases its wage o¤er for employee j of equilibrium
rm Fi (s). In case the wage o¤er is large enough to attract j to Fh (s),
the e¤ect on an employee k 6= j of Fi (s) can be of two kinds: ks value
added to Fi (s) may weakly increase (making j and k substitutes) or weakly
decrease (complements). If k leaves Fi (s), then the value created by the
groupGk  Fi (s) is diminished, since k is the best manager for its members.
Also, the value of j 2 Fi (s) with k 2 Gj is diminished, since j is no longer
required as the best manager for k. These are complement e¤ects. On the
other hand, j could replace k as managers for the individuals in Gk, if j is
the best alternative manager for such an individual within the rm. This is
a substitute e¤ect.
3 Incomes
3.1 The Earnings of Entrepreneurs
Like the organization structure, the division of income in a rm between
the entrepreneur and the workforce is uniquely determined. Entrepreneurs
have no preference between receiving their income in wages or prots; all
that matters are the combined receipts. Let v(1)i; v(2)i; : : : denote the highest,
second-highest, etc. productivity i has under the potential managers in the
population.
Proposition (P7). In any equilibrium s, for all i 2 N such that Fi (s) 6= ?
(i.e. for all entrepreneurs),
wei (w) (i) + i (s
) = v(1)i +
X
j2Gini
 
v(1)j   v(2)j

:
It is quite intuitive that an entrepreneur earns the value of his contribu-
tion to the rm, which consists of his own productivity vii = v(1)i and the
productivity increase his management achieves for his subordinates in the ef-
cient organization. Because the entrepreneur makes ultimatum wage o¤ers,
he can appropriate all benets he bestows on the rm. Workforce income in
rm Fi (s) is the di¤erence between total value created in Fi (s) and the
entrepreneurial income.
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Importantly, employees as a group appropriate all value that is created
below the highest level of managers, that reports directly to entrepreneurs.
Since the value created further down in the hierarchy depends only on em-
ployees, other entrepreneurs could replicate it in their rms by hiring comple-
mentary groups and recreating their previous assignments in the new rm.
In particular, anyone can employ the entire workforce of an existing rm and
will only lose some productivity among the "top managers" that depended
on the old entrepreneur. This is in one sense a peculiarity of our modeling
choices because we restricted a managers impact to the organization level
immediately below. While this is not descriptively realistic, it captures the
avor of how value appropriation works in hierarchical organizations. One
can imagine how a leader who "inspires" employees at all levels of the rm
could reap large returns, but the essential constraints would remain the same.
We show now that an equilibrium exists, by constructing an explicit equi-
librium wage function for the employees. There are, however, many ways to
allocate workforce income among employees: entrepreneurs are indi¤erent
between wage o¤er schemes that leave the rms prot una¤ected. It is not
necessarily true that the entrepreneur must pay every worker a wage that
reects the productive contribution to the rm. A wage increase for a group
of employees reduces its incentive to defect and may therefore permit o¤-
setting wage decreases for other employees (who could otherwise protably
attract the group through a unilateral change in wage o¤ers). Hence there
is no reason why equilibrium wages should be unique. Such redistributions
must, however, leave the total wage bill of the rm unchanged. Which wage
scheme to implement is a matter of choice, not coincidence, given that the
entrepreneur makes the o¤ers.
Proposition (P8). There exists an equilibrium s where the wage o¤ers
accepted by i = 1; : : : ; N (including entrepreneurs) are14
wei (w) (i) = v(2)i +
X
j2Gi
 
v(1)j   v(2)j

:
14Given that entrepreneurs pay themselves the "market wage," i.e. their opportunity
cost, entrepreneurial prot is the di¤erence between the value they create under self-
management and what they would create under the next-best manager: i (s) = v(1)i  
v(2)i.
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The maximal value created by workers in Gi for the rm Fh (s) depends
solely on i; not on is manager, or even the entrepreneur h. This suggests the
solution derived in P8: everyone is paid the incremental prot made under
his or her managerial supervision (by the group Gi for whom i is the best
manager) since that prot could be transferred to another rm (if i is hired
together with is complementary block Gi). Hence, managers receive, for each
worker they manage, the wedge between the workers productivity and what
that productivity would have been under the best alternative manager. In
addition, they get their own productivity under the best alternative manager
(which informs the second-highest bid for their services). As natural as this
arrangement may appear, it is certainly not the only one that can occur in
equilibrium; the entrepreneur can make transfers between workers, since the
complementarity structure only makes it optimal to leave the rm as long as
other workers have the same incentive.
3.2 Entrepreneurial Entry and the Average Wage
Now, consider adding a new agent to the population, transforming the econ-
omy from the prior game   to the posterior game  ^. We speak of entrepre-
neurial entry when the new arrival is an entrepreneur in the posterior game
and increases the number of entrepreneurs by one (else, it would reect an
acquisition of an existing rm). Hence, as we dene it, entrepreneurial entry
does not replace any of the previous entrepreneurs: we are interested in the
e¤ect a growing number of entrepreneurs (equivalently, increasing demand in
the labor market).15
Let O  fi 2 N s.t. Fi (s) 6= ?g be the set of entrepreneurs, with N^ and
O^ denoting, respectively, the population and the set of entrepreneurs after
entry.
Proposition (P9). Entrepreneurial entry increases the average employee
wage: if N^ = N [ fhg and h 2 O^ = O [ fhg, then
1
kNk   kOk
X
i2NnO
wei (w) (i) 
1N^  O^
X
i2N^nO^
w^e^i (w^) (i) :
15It is a property of the equilibrium organization structure that, after entrepreneurial
entry, existing entrepreneurs will either become employees of the new entrepreneur (moving
with their entire rm - which we do not allow), or will remain entrepreneurs (they will
not, for instance, join another rm that previously existed).
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At the same time, entrepreneurial entry decreases the average income of
incumbent entrepreneurs:
1
kOk
X
i2O
(wi (i) + i (s
))  1kOk
X
i2O
(w^i (i) + ^i (s
)) :
The intuition for rising average wages is the following. The additional
entrepreneur increases competition in the labor market by introducing new
jobs that represent alternative uses of each individualslabor services. Some
employees are likely to lose in the reassignment of workers, since their man-
agerial capacities are in less demand. Suppose i is an employee who switches
to the new entrepreneur. Her former manager was able to appropriate some
of is productivity in the old rm. After is departure, the old rm becomes
the best alternative employer for i, and i must therefore appropriate in the
new rm the full value she created in the old rm. This includes the share
her former manager is losing in wages there. Hence, all wage reductions are
at least o¤set by raises for the new entrepreneurs hires.
In specic circumstances, additional entrepreneurs strictly increase em-
ployee wages. We say that imitative entrepreneurial entry by h occurs if
h =2 N and there exists, for some entrepreneur i 2 N , an agent j 2 Gi
(is employee and direct subordinate in the prior games equilibrium s) who
switches to h, i.e. j 2 G^h. Such entry is imitative in the sense that h e¤ec-
tively hires a "division" of the incumbent rm Fi (s); Fh (s^) replicates the
organization of Fi (s) in one top-to-bottom branch.
Proposition (P10). The average employee wage strictly increases (and
average income of incumbent entrepreneurs strictly decreases) when imitative
entrepreneurial entry occurs.
When one of the new entrepreneurs hires is a "top manager" (head of a
division) of an existing rm, then the manager who loses by the transfer is
in fact an entrepreneur. The top manager now appropriates in her new wage
the full contribution she made to the old rm (else the previous employer
would su¢ ciently raise the bid to convince her to stay). Because part of it
previously did not accrue to employees, average employee income goes up.
This explains P10.
The wage increase may be strict even if entrepreneurship is not imitative,
since the new entrepreneur could raise the highest alternative productivity
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for a top manager who nevertheless stays with the old rm. This makes it
necessary for the employer to raise the employees wage.
4 Relative Payo¤s: Employees vs. Entrepre-
neurs
The expected monetary return to entrepreneurship is generally found to be
low or negative compared to wage income. Overly optimistic beliefs (Camerer
and Lovallo [6], Koellinger et al. [23], Arabsheibani et al. [1], de Meza and
Southey [8], Frank [15]) or inherent preference for entrepreneurship (Benz
and Frey [3], Blanchower et al. [4]) have been advanced as explanations.16
Vereshchagina and Hopenhayn [38] recently argued that entrepreneurs who
are "insured" by an exit option (such as employment) may e¤ectively behave
in a risk-seeking manner (accept a negative risk premium), even if they are
risk-averse in the usual sense, i.e. with respect to consumption.
We o¤er a rationale for lower entrepreneurial incomes that is not a con-
sequence of imperfect information or preferences or insurance. Competition
in the labor market forces entrepreneurs to invent roles for employees that
maximize their productivities, hence their value to the rm. Entrepreneurs
thereby raise their own "opportunity costs" in the form of well-paid jobs for
workers.17 We can illustrate with a small-scale example how the average in-
come of entrepreneurs can be strictly lower than the average wage employees
earn in equilibrium. Recall that equilibrium wages are not unique because
income can be redistributed among the employees of a rm. Such redistribu-
tions do not change average wages, since entrepreneurial incomes are uniquely
identied. However, for tangibility we use the particular equilibrium wage
16There is also an "investment view" (Bohacek [5], Polkovnichenko [31]) according to
which entrepreneurs initially forego income in the expectation of large future rewards. But
it seems inconsistent with Hamiltons observation that entrepreneurial rms, on average,
underperform relative to entry-level wages even after long periods of operation.
17To be sure, these are not the true opportunity costs, but they are the opportunity costs
empirical work imputes, since we can only match entrepreneurs to a reference group of
employees using relatively coarse information. People who look comparable in the dataset
may actually di¤er in ways that would be obvious to a recruiter. Then entrepreneurs are
not choosing low returns over higher wages; they simply cannot get those wages, although
the data might suggest they can. Rees and Shah [33] have produced empirical support
for the contention that existing high-pay jobs are not necessarily available to those who
choose to be entrepreneurs.
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function from P8:
wei (w) (i) = v(2)i +
X
j2Gi
 
v(1)j   v(2)j

:
Example. Consider the following conditional productivities for individuals
x, y and z. Value vxy (that y can generate under the management of x)
is found where the y-row (listing ys productivity under various managers)
meets the x-column (listing xs managerial contribution to various employ-
ees).
Employer x y z
x 0 7 2
Employee y 0 1 2
z 0 1 2
In equilibrium, all agents are assigned to the manager under whom they
are most productive (a feature of e¢ cient organizations) and to the rm
which employs the best manager. Hence, x must be managed by y, while y
must be managed by z. There is one rm in equilibrium: the entrepreneur z
hires y and z, and assigns y as xs manager. Agent z emerges as an entrepre-
neur because he can generate more value under his own management than
under the management of anyone else. According to the equilibrium wage
function in P8, x will earn 2 (reecting his best alternative productivity, un-
der z), y will earn 6 (including the di¤erence of 5 between xs productivity
under y and under z), and z will pay himself a wage of 2 (including the di¤er-
ence of 1 between ys productivity under z and under y) and earn a residual
prot of 1. Average employee income is 4, compared to the entrepreneur-
ial income of 3. (That entrepreneurial income is lower, as in this case, is a
possibility, depending on primitives, not a regularity.)
To verify that these payo¤s constitute a Nash equilibrium, note that, if z
o¤ered x less than 2 or y less than 6, y would have an incentive to create a rm
that hires x and generates a total value of 8 (which can be divided between
x and y such that both benet). The payo¤s make y exactly indi¤erent to
the "spin-o¤" option, hence they maximize the entrepreneur zs income. In
alternative equilibria, z would transfer income from x to y, perhaps o¤ering
x nothing, while y is paid 8. Or x could be o¤ered 7, and y only gets 1.
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What is common to all equilibria is that the entrepreneur z cannot extract
any rent from the employment of x because x and y could defect if they are
not fully compensated for the prot they generate between themselves. Since
most of the value is created by these two, average employee incomes are high
relative to the entrepreneurs. Yet, z can do no better than to run his own
business.
Now consider the entry of an additional entrepreneur e, leaving all other
conditional productivities una¤ected.
Employer x y z e
x 0 7 2 0
Employee y 0 1 2 3
z 0 1 2 0
e 0 1 2 3
The new agent e replaces z as the best manager for y and becomes an
entrepreneur since he is most productive working for himself. Therefore,
the new rm structure consists of es organization, which includes y and
x (where y still manages x), and z as a lone self-employed entrepreneur.
Because e adopts part of the organization structure formerly implemented
by z (copies zs production technology), we call e an imitative entrepreneur.
The wage for y given by P8 increases from 6 to 7 because the new bid raises
the best alternative o¤er for y (which is now zs), while xs wage remains
una¤ected (given that e has no direct use for x). The entry of the imitative
entrepreneur bids up the average wage from 4 to 4:5 owing to the greater
competition for scarce production resources: es technology is intensive in
the same kind of labor as zs. Among the entrepreneurs, e earns 4 (highest
productivity under an alternative manager plus the wedge of 1 from superior
management of y and residual prot 1), and z loses income he was previously
able to appropriate from y: zs wage of 1 is complemented by a prot of
1. Incumbent entrepreneurial income therefore declines to 2 (while average
entrepreneurial income remains the same).
Finally, suppose e enters with an innovative idea, which causes him to
implement a "novel" production technology that is intensive in xs labor.
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Employer x y z e
x 0 7 2 8
Employee y 0 1 2 0
z 0 1 2 0
e 0 1 2 3
Compared to the original scenario (without e), e replaces y as the best
manager for x, while z remains the best manager for himself and for y. Thus,
two rms emerge in equilbrium: e hires x, and z hires y. Now x benets
from es arrival; his wage increases by 5 from 2 to 7 (since z now makes the
second-highest bid, based on zs productivity under the management of zs
employee y). Because y no longer manages x, y loses the wedge of 5 he could
formerly extract from managing x. The total wage bill in the economy here is
unchanged by es entry; the increase in xs wage matches exactly the decrease
in ys wage. This is a reection of the equilibrium property that the workforce
fully appropriates any value created below the top-management level. Since
entry only changes the productivity of x, who was previously managed by an
employee and therefore shared the value with an employee, xs reassignment
merely induces a transfer between employees. The income of entrepreneur
z also remains constant because z could not previously extract rents from
employing x; z had to compensate y fully for his managerial skills. However,
since e attains a higher income than z (namely 4, including the managerial
contribution of 1 to ys productivity, and prot of 1), entrepreneurial incomes
here increase on average after entry.
This example illustrates that the average wage increases when the num-
ber of entrepreneurs increases, where innovative entry yields the minimal case
that average wage stays the same. The average income of incumbent entre-
preneurs decreases (again, it may be constant when entry is innovative), while
the average income of all entrepreneurs could increase or decrease, depending
on the value the entrant creates for himself. Here, entrepreneurial activity
raises its own opportunity cost to a point where entrepreneurial incomes are
on average lower than wages (this was the case in all three scenarios).
5 Conclusion
The choice to become an entrepreneur is usually modelled independently
from the matching of non-entrepreneurs to jobs. Since job roles determine
23
wages, and wages represent the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship, occu-
pational choice and job matching are in reality determined simultaneously.
Our framework accounts for this. Rather than assume a particular technol-
ogy where workers are either substitutes or complements, we recognize that
entrepreneurs have an incentive to delegate by building hierarchical organiza-
tions, where employees perform quasi-entrepreneurial tasks (i.e. become ex-
ecutives) and are rewarded for their talents. Managerial assignments lead to
rich internal patterns of complementary and substitute relationships among
employees.
We derive a unique value-sharing rule between entrepreneurs and workers
in a unique rm formation equilibrium and show that more entrepreneurs
imply a higher average wage income. While this is intuitive when workers
are substitutes, job switching in the presence of complementarities imposes
losses on co-workers. When the star of a new director rises in Hollywood,
the race to sign top actors intensies. Another director is forced to cast
lesser names and accept a less lucrative contract. Who you work with a¤ects
your value to your employer: hence, McKinsey pays the highest salaries in the
consulting industry, and consultants in second-tier rms earn less, even if they
are of similar quality. Simple supply-and-demand economics might suggest
that greater demand (a world with McKinsey, compared to without) will not
reduce anyones wages while supply is xed. Yet, if McKinsey disappeared, it
is a fair guess that second-tier rms could hire better consultants who would
raise their colleaguesproductivities and pay.
When complementarities are present, because rms have internal organi-
zation, the arrival of a new entrepreneur is not good news for all workers.
The reasoning that the additional employer can only increase the highest con-
ditional productivity for each worker, and thus individual wages, does not
apply when productivities depend on organization designs, which are broken
up by entry. Entrepreneurial entry will reduce wages for some workers. What
survives, and is robust to the specic pattern of complementarities that arises
in equilibrium, is that the average wage increases with entrepreneurial entry.
Hence, high salaries (and relatively low returns to entrepreneurship) are a
hallmark of an entrepreneurial sector that builds e¢ cient organizations and
delegates valuable tasks to employees.
The stereotypical founder is a free spirit who would not function well as
just another wheel in a clockwork. At the same time, many capable individ-
uals (who are adaptable) pursue corporate careers. Because we account for
the value they add as managers, they choose employment over entrepreneur-
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ship in our model. While it may seem unrealistic that entrepreneurs tend
to have relatively little value as employees, our model certainly allows for
entrepreneurs to be potential high earners in employment. But the empirical
fact that entrepreneurs earn less on average than non-entrepreneurs is more
consistent with many entrepreneurs having relatively poor earning prospects
in traditional employment. For entrepreneurs who are professionals or skilled
inventors, this may not be the case, but there is another type of entrepre-
neur who never acquired experience in employment or specic training and
is stuck in self-employment. Our framework accommodates both types, not
by assumption but by endogenous determination.
6 Proofs
P1
(i) Replacing anymi with an optimal assignment of managers, i.e. mi (j; C) =
h such that vhj  vkj for all k 2 C, can only be benecial, and one may con-
struct opposing strategy proles s i against which it is a strict improvement
over any suboptimal assignment. (Specically, let the person who is subop-
timally assigned join Fi (s).) If i accepts someone elses wage o¤er, then is
payo¤ increases directly with a higher wage.
(ii) Suppose is strategy is to turn down a higher wage o¤er from another
individual for a lower wage o¤er from another individual for some particular
set of o¤ers ~w i. Clearly, an alternative strategy that always accepts the
highest wage o¤er, conditional on i taking a job in another rm (not becoming
an entrepreneur), never fares worse and strictly improves is payo¤ in case
~w i is played.

P2
Let Fi (s) 6= ?, and suppose i =2 Fi (s). Take any x0 2 Fi (s), and
label mi (x0; Fi (s
)) = x1, mi (x1; Fi (s
)) = x2, etc. Consider the sequence
fxtgt2N. Non-circularity (with our assumption that conditional productivities
under di¤erent managers are unique) implies vxt+xt+ > vxtxt+ for all positive
integers . Because Fi (s) is nite, it must be that mi (xt+; Fi (s
)) = xt for
some t and some non-negative integer . Since assignments are hierarchical,
and i =2 Fi (s), there exists no xt 2 Fi (s) such that mi (xt; Fi (s)) = xt.
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Hence  is not zero. P1i requiresmi (xt+; Fi (s
)) = xt only if vxtxt+  vyxt+
for all y 2 Fi (s). In particular vxtxt+  vxt+xt+ , a contradiction.

P3
(i) If x 2 Gi, , then vix > vkx for all k 2 N n i, which means there exists
i such that vix > vjx for any j 6= i, thus x =2 Gj.
(ii) If j 2 Gi, then j 2 Gi is immediate from the denition of Gi.
(iii) If j 2 Gi, then there exists a sequence fk1; k2; : : : ; kg  N such that
k1 2 Gi, k2 2 Gk1... j 2 Gk. Thus vik1 > vk1k1, vk1k2 > vk2k2 ... vkj > vjj
(uniqueness of the conditional productivities makes the inequalities strict).
Applying noncircularity, we have vii > vji.
Hence it is not the case that vji  vki for all k 2 N , i.e. (a) i =2 Gj. If
i 2 Gj, then we have a chain that starts with vik1 > vk1k1, passes through
vkj > vjj; vjl1 > vl1l1, and terminates at vli > vii. Noncircularity then implies
the contradiction vii > vii, so (b) i =2 Gj. If j 2 Gj, then vjj  vkj for
all k 2 N ; in particular vjj  vij, which is at odds with j 2 Gi  Gi and
uniqueness. Thus (c) j =2 Gj. Let x 2 Gj. Then either x 2 Gj or there exists
a sequence fk01; k02; : : : ; k0g  N such that k01 2 Gj, k02 2 Gk01 ... x 2 Gk0. In
both cases, j 2 Gi implies there is a sequence fl1; l2; : : : ; lg  N such that
j 2 Gi, l1 2 Gj, l2 2 Gl1 ... x 2 Gl. Therefore x 2 Gi. So (d) Gj  Gi, and
by (ii) and (iiic) j is in Gi but not in Gj, so the inclusion is strict.
(iv) Suppose there exists x 2 Gi \ Gj. Then there are sequences K =
fk1; k2; : : : ; kg  N such that k1 2 Gj, k2 2 Gk1 ... x 2 Gk and K 0 =
fk01; k02; : : : ; k0g  N such that k01 2 Gj0, k02 2 Gk01 ... x 2 Gk0. It follows from
(i) that x 2 Gk \Gk0 6= ? only if k = k0 etc. Therefore K  K 0 or K 0  K,
and thus either i 2 K 0 or j 2 K, i.e. either i 2 Gj or j 2 Gi. By (iiid),
j 2 Gi implies Gj  Gi, and i 2 Gj implies Gi  Gj.
If j; j0 2 Gi, suppose Gj \ Gj0 6= ?, so that Gj  Gj0 or Gj0  Gj0. In the
rst case, j 2 Gi implies i 2 Gj0; in the second case, j0 2 Gi implies i 2 Gj -
either of which contradicts (iiib). We conclude Gj \ Gj0 = ?.
(v) If j 2 Gi, j 6= i, then Gj  Gi by (iiid). Hence [j2Gi Gj  Gi.
Moreover, Gi  Gi by (ii), which establishes the  part of the equality. If
x 2 Gi and x =2 Gi, then there exists fk1; k2; : : : ; kg  N such that k1 2 Gi,
k2 2 Gk1 ... x 2 Gk. It follows that x 2 Gk1 for some k1 2 Gi, or x =2 Gi.
Relabeling k1 as j, we have Gi  Gi [
[
j2Gi
Gj.

26
P4
We show: for all i; j; k 2 N , if j 2 Fi (s) and k 2 Gj, then k 2 Fi (s).
This implies j 2 Fi (s) only if Gj  Fi (s), and we apply P3 to argue
Gj  Fi (s) only if Gj  Fi (s).
Let k 2 Gj, and suppose s is such that j 2 Fi (s) while k 2 Fh (s),
with h 6= i. Since s is an equilibrium, the prot generated by hs employees
cannot be negative:X
x2Fh(s)nh
vmh(x;Fh(s))x  
X
x2Fh(s)nh
wh (x)  0; (2)
else h could strictly improve on uh (s) by o¤ering wh (x) = 0 to all x 2
Fh (s
). If h 2 Fh (s), i.e. h is an entrepreneur,
uh (s
) = vmh(h;Fh(s))h +
X
x2Fh(s)nh
vmh(x;Fh(s))x  
X
x2Fh(s)nh
wh (x) : (3)
Suppose i o¤ered every one of hs employees a slightly higher wage:
~wi (x) = w

h (x)+" for all x 2 Fh (s)nh, with " > 0. If h 2 Fh (s), suppose i
also o¤ered h a wage that exceeds the current payo¤: ~wi (h) = uh (s)+". Any
employer-choice function that would reject these o¤ers is not undominated,
hence cannot be part of an equilibrium strategy. (P1ii implies x 2 Fh (s)
only if h o¤ered the highest wage to x in s. After topping the o¤er, i must
be the high bidder and gain x.) We show that it is in fact an improvement
for i to o¤er these wages for some " > 0.
The payo¤ for i when running rm Fi
 
~si; s

 i

= Fi (s
) [ Fh (s) after
increased o¤ers ~wi, with all else equal, is
ui
 
~si; s

 i

= ui (s
) +
X
x2Fh(s)
vmi (x;Fi(~si;s i))x
 
X
x2Fh(s)
wh (x)
 
X
x2Fh(s)
"
 ui (s) +
X
x2Fh(s)

vmi (x;Fi(~si;s i))x
  vmh(x;Fh(s))x

 
X
x2Fh(s)
" (4)
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if h =2 Fh (s), and
ui
 
~si; s

 i

= ui (s
) +
X
x2Fh(s)
vmi (x;Fi(~si;s i))x
 
X
x2Fh(s)nh
wh (x)  uh (s)
 
X
x2Fh(s)
"
 ui (s) +
X
x2Fh(s)

vmi (x;Fi(~si;s i))x
  vmh(x;Fh(s))x

 
X
x2Fh(s)
" (5)
if h 2 Fh (s). Inequalities (4) and (5) derive, respectively, from (2) and (3).
For all x 2 Fh (s),
vmi (x;Fi(~si;s i))x
 vmh(x;Fh(s))x;
since Fh (s)  Fi
 
~si; s

 i

. Because si is undominated, P1i implies that
the assignment mi is value-maximizing. Clearly, the maximal conditional
productivity for any x 2 Fh (s) must be at least as large in Fi
 
~si; s

 i

as in
Fh (s
).
Since k 2 Gj and j =2 Fh (s),
vjk > vmh(k;F h)k
:
On the other hand j 2 Fi (s)  Fi
 
~si; s

 i

, so mi
 
k; Fi
 
~si; s

 i

= j and
vmi (k; ~Fi)k
= vjk. Then ui
 
~si; s

 i
  ui (s) if
" =
vjk   vmh(k;Fh(s))k
n+ 1
> 0:
The deviation establishes that k 2 Fh (s) for any h 6= i is not pos-
sible in equilibrium. Thus k 2 Fi (s), and we have demonstrated that
j 2 Fi (s) leads to Gj  Fi (s). Let x 2 Gj and x =2 Gj. Then there
exists fk1; k2; : : : ; kg  N such that k1 2 Gj; k2 2 Gk1 ; : : : ; x 2 Gk. From
j 2 Fi (s) and k1 2 Gj we have k1 2 Fi (s), applying our prior argu-
ment. Similarly, k1 2 Fi (s) and k2 2 Gk1 imply k2 2 Fi (s). Inductively,
k1; k2; : : : ; k 2 Fi (s), and therefore x 2 Fi (s). It follows that j 2 Fi (s)
entails Gj  Fi (s).
28
P5
Since i 2 Fi (s) by P2 if Fi (s) 6= ?, P4 requires Gi  Fi (s). It remains
to be shown that Fi (s)  Gi, or equivalently N n Gi  N nFi (s). Suppose
x 2 N n Gi and x 2 Fi (s). We relabel x as x0 and reconstruct the sequence
fxtgt2N as in the proof of P2. Observe that i 6= xt for any t; else we would
have x 2 Gi. By our prior argument, mi (xt+; Fi (s)) = xt for some t and
integer  > 0, which violates noncircularity unless mi (xt; Fi (s
)) = xt for
some xt 2 Fi (s) 6= i. But this does not satisfy the hierarchy requirement.
Hence x 2 N n Fi (s), and we have established Fi (s) = Gi.

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Follows from P2 and the fact that j 2 Fi (s) only if k 2 Fi (s) such
that j 2 Gk, which is what we have to show. If j 2 Fi (s) and j 2 Gk, but
k 2 F h with h 6= i, then j 2 F h : by P3ii Gk  Gk, and by P4, Gk  F h .
This contradicts the premise j 2 Fi (s).

P7
To see that
wei (w) (i) + i (s
)  v(1)i +
X
j2Gini
 
v(1)j   v(2)j

;
note
wei (w) (i) + i (s
) 
X
j2Fi(s)
vmi (j;Fi(s))j  
X
j2Fi(s)ni
wi (j)
=
X
j2 Gi
v(1)j  
X
j2 Gini
wi (j)
(the rms prot and wages must be covered by equilibrium output).
We shall refer to Gj [ j such that j 2 Gi n i (i.e. j is a top-level manager)
as a branch of is rm. Wage payments by i to a branch must exceed the
highest productivity Gj[j would have in other rms; else it would be optimal
for someone else to beat is o¤ers to all member of Gj [ j. (Namely, for the
employer of js best alternative manager j0. If j0 is employed by i, then it
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is optimal for the employer of the best alternative manager of j0s branch
"head" k to beat is o¤er to Gj [ j [ Gk [ k. Noncircularity ensures that i
is ultimately constrained by competition from other entrepreneurs who have
the highest alternative valuation for one branch or several branches jointly.
For notational simplicity, we focus on the special case that branches can
be considered separately, i.e. the best alternative manager of each branch
head in Fi (s) belongs to another rm. When best alternative managers are
employees of Fi (s) in other branches, multiple branches must be considered
as one, but the logic is identical.)
The individual who is the best alternative manager for j also has the
second-highest valuation for Gj (since Gj [ j includes the best managers for
all members of Gj, so that the productivity of Gj [ j varies only with js
productivity). Thus, if j 2 Gi then i has to pay to Gj [ j in totalX
k2 Gj[j
wi (k)  v(2)j +
X
k2 Gjnj
v(1)k:
Because Gi n i =
[
j2Gini
Gj and the Gj do not intersect by P3, we haveX
l2 Gini
wi (l) =
X
j2Gini
X
k2 Gj[j
wi (k)
=
X
j2Gini
v(2)j +
X
j2Gini
X
k2 Gjnj
v(1)k
=
X
j2Gini
v(2)j +
X
j2 GinGi
v(1)j:
Now
wei (w) (i) + i (s
) 
X
j2 Gi
v(1)j  
X
j2Gini
v(2)j  
X
j2 GinGi
v(1)j
= v(1)i +
X
j2Gini
 
v(1)j   v(2)j

:
From the entrepreneurs income-maximizing behavior, it follows that the
last expression holds with equality.

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We construct the equilibrium s as follows. Manager assignments r
are value-maximizing (satisfy P6), and employer choices e select the high-
est wage o¤er (or, in case of a tie, the o¤er from the individual who is
the better manager). The high bid for each i 2 N is w(1) (i) = v(2)i +P
j2Gi
 
v(1)j   v(2)j

, and is made by the person who is the best manager for
i, i.e. h such that vhi = v(1)i. The high bid is matched by the person who is
the second-best manager for j, i.e. h0 such that vh0i = v(2)i.
The resulting rms are, for i = 1; : : : ; N , Fi (s) = Gi if i 2 Gi and
Fi (s
) = ? otherwise, which means s is hierarchical. We argue that s is
also Nash. No one can have an incentive to deviate by reorganizing an e¢ cient
equilibrium rm (change ri ). Accepting the highest wage o¤er is always best
for non-entrepreneurs and, given the form of the winning o¤ers, implies that
i becomes an entrepreneur if and only if i 2 Gi. In Fi (s), i adds at least
vii +
P
j2Gi
 
v(1)j   v(2)j

under the manager assignment mi . If i 2 Gi, then
vii = v(1)i, so i can earn more income through contributing to prot in Fi (s)
than from the highest competing wage o¤er. Conversely, suppose i =2 Gi, but
i turns down the highest wage o¤er to become an entrepreneur. Because the
entrepreneurs income is independent of the wage paid to self, this scenario
is akin to an increase in wage o¤ers. We may therefore conne ourselves to
considering changes in wage o¤ers.
Observe rst that i cannot protably reduce wage o¤ers. Suppose i is
an entrepreneur. Employing j 2 Fi (s) at wage w(1) (j) is strictly protable
for i, since j 2 Gi and j 2 Gk implies k 2 Gi, so that j is assigned to the
best manager and directly adds v(1)j > v(2)j to the rm Fi (s). Moreover
Gj  Gi, hence j indirectly adds at least
P
x2Gi
 
v(1)x   v(2)x

to Fi (s) as
the best manager for the group Gj. O¤ering less than w(1) (j) loses j to the
previously second-highest bidder and therefore reduces is prot. If i is not
an entrepreneur, then none of is wage o¤ers are accepted, and lowering them
does not change anything for i.
No more can i protably increase wage o¤ers. If i is to benet from raising
o¤ers, they must be accepted and add to membership in Fi (s). Suppose i
attracts the group C from outside Fi (s). Then i must o¤er strictly more
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than w(1) (j) to each j 2 C:X
j2C
wi (j) 
X
j2C
w(1)j =
X
j2C
v(2)j +
X
j2C
X
x2Gj
 
v(1)x   v(2)x

=
X
j2C
v(2)j +
X
x2[j2CGj
 
v(1)x   v(2)x

:
Since Fi (s) initially included all ideal managers for its employees, mem-
bers of C can only add value directly or through managing other members of
C. I.e. their contribution to Fi (s) is
P
j2C maxk2Fi(s) vkj. Denote the sub-
set of C with best managers in C by C0  fx 2 C s.t. x 2 Gj with j 2 Cg.
Because Fi (s) already included anyone whose ideal manager is in Fi (s),
all other members of C, i.e. j 2 C n C0, cannot make a direct contribution
greater than v(2)j to Fi (s). The contribution C makes to Fi (s) is therefore
at most: X
j2C0
v(1)j +
X
j2CnC0
v(2)j 
X
j2C
max
k2Fi(s)
vkj:
Because C0  [j2CGj,X
j2C
wi (j) 
X
j2C
v(2)j +
X
x2[j2CGj
 
v(1)x   v(2)x

=
X
j2C0
v(2)j +
X
j2C0
 
v(1)j   v(2)j

+
X
j2CnC0
v(2)j +
X
x2[j2CGjnC0
 
v(1)x   v(2)x

=
X
j2C0
v(1)j +
X
j2CnC0
v(2)j +
X
x2[j2CGjnC0
 
v(1)x   v(2)x


X
j2C
max
k2Fi(s)
vkj +
X
x2[j2CGjnC0
 
v(1)x   v(2)x

:
This means i would pay more for C than its members can contribute to
Fi (s
); raising bids is not protable.
Hence individuals are optimizing in all three strategic components in s,
and s is a hierarchical equilibrium.

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Pre-entry total employee income is:X
i2NnO
wei (w) (i) =
X
i2N
v(1)i  
X
i2O
(wi (i) + i (s
))
=
X
i2NnO
v(1)i  
X
i2O
X
j2Gini
 
v(1)j   v(2)j

=
X
i2Nn[j2OGj
v(1)i +
X
i2[j2OGjnj
v(2)j:
Post-entry, the set of employees is unchanged and highest- and second-
highest conditional productivities for any agent either stay the same or are
raised by the new entrepreneur. Hence total employment income could only
fall for one reason: that the set N n [j2EGj shrinks and the set [j2EGj n j
grows, i.e. some who were previously managed by employees are now directly
managed by entrepreneurs. But any such individuals must be managed by the
new entrepreneur, given that no other entrepreneurs value changed. There-
fore, they belong, post-entry, to G^h, so that v^(1)j = v^hj. and v^(2)j = v(1)j.
Then their contribution to the right-hand side above stays the same. Since
kNk   kOk =
N^  O^ andX
i2NnO
wei (w) (i) 
X
i2N^nO^
w^e^i (w^) (i) ;
average employee income weakly increases.
Pre-entry total entrepreneurial income is:X
i2O
(wi (i) + i (s
)) =
X
i2O
v(1)i +
X
i2O
X
j2Gini
 
v(1)j   v(2)j

=
X
i2O
v(1)i +
X
i2[j2EGjnj
 
v(1)i   v(2)i

:
Incumbent entrepreneurs i for whom v(1)i increases post-entry must become
employees of the new entrepreneur, but the denition of entrepreneurial entry
rules this scenario out (such entry does not replace existing entrepreneurs).
Therefore, the rst term remains constant. The set [j2EGj n j of employees
for whom an incumbent entrepreneur is the best manager can only shrink
after the new entrepreneur appears. The highest conditional productivities
for those who remain in this set post-entry cannot have increased (else they
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would now be managed best by the new entrepreneur). The second-highest
conditional productivities cannot have decreased. Hence the second term
diminishes, so that total income of the incumbent entrepreneurs decreases.
Since kOk =
O^ andX
i2O
(wi (i) + i (s
)) 
X
i2O
(w^i (i) + ^i (s^
)) ;
average income of incumbent entrepreneurs weakly falls.

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Suppose entrepreneurial entry is imitative. Then, by denition, there
exists for some incumbent entrepreneur i an employee j 2 Gi who switches
to the new entrepreneur, i.e. j 2 G^h. Then v^(1)j = v^hj > vij = v(1)j and
v^(2)j = v^ij > v(2)j. Recalling thatX
i2NnO
wei (w) (i) =
X
i2Nn[j2OGj
v(1)i +
X
i2[j2OGjnj
v(2)j;
and also that the identities of employees are unchanged and nothing can
decrease on the right-hand side, the strict increase in v(1)j and v(2)j implies
a strict increase in the average employee income.
Because i loses a member of Gi n i andX
i2O
(wi (i) + i (s
)) =
X
i2O
v(1)i +
X
i2O
X
j2Gini
 
v(1)j   v(2)j

(while incumbent entrepreneurs cannot become best managers for anyone
new as a result of entrepreneurial entry), the average average income of in-
cumbent entrepreneurs strictly decreases.

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